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The process of capital accumulation plays a central role in the growth
of every economy. As a consequence, capital accumulation has been a major focus
of economic theory and of empirical research throughout the history of modern
economic analysis. In recent decades, the rate and form of capital accumula-
tion has been substantially influenced by prevailing systems of taxation. The
papers in this volume1analyzethe ways in which capital taxation alters the pro-
cess of capital accumulation and affects the rewards to capital and labor.
The emphasis in these studies is on the behavioral response of house-
holds and businesses to changes in tax rules. The first section deals with the
overall rate of saving and analyzes the separate effects of taxes on personal
saving and on corporate saving as well as the interaction between the two types
of saving. The papers in the second section examine the effect of tax rules on
the composition of household portfolios and on the process of portfolio adjust-
ment. In the third section, I turn to corporate investment in plant and equip-
ment and in inventories. The studies in these three sections focus on the indi-
vidual components of the capital accumulation process rather than on the process
as a whole. In contrast, the fourth section presents general equilibrium analy-
ses that look at the system as a whole in order to determine who bears the taxes
levied on capital and capital income. The studies in this section differ from
earlier treatments in the literature by emphasizing a growing economy and port-
folio diversification.
1This paper is an introductory chapter to a book entitled Capital Taxation
that brings together 22 of my papers written between 1965 and 1981. A list of
papers and their original publication information is presented as an appendix to
this paper. Because much of the research in the volume predates my NBER
association, the volume will not be published by the NBER but by Harvard
University Press.—2—
A common theme throughout these chapters is that tax rules have a
substantial effect on economic decisions. Both the theoretical analyses and the
empirical research in the present volume support this theme. In contrast, much
of the writing on taxation during the period since World War II implicitly
assumed or explicitly asserted that the relative price changes implied by dif-
ferent types of capital taxation would have little or no impact on capital for-
mation. The view that taxes do not influence capital formation followed from a
general Keynesian presumption that the responses of individuals and businesses
to price changes are small and from the more specific beliefs that saving
reflects income rather than the rate of return and that investment is determined
by capacity utilization or anticipated sales rather than by the relation between
the net—of—tax cost of funds and the net-of-tax return that firms can earn on
those funds. The present studies contradict this presumption of low price
elasticities and show that tax rules significantly alter economic behavior.
These behavioral responses imply that tax rules distort both the
amount of capital formation and the distribution of capital and of risk bearing
in the economy. Such distortions imply a loss of economic efficiency and thus a
lower level of real economic income.I have, however, limited the papers in
this volume to the positive analysis of the effects of capital taxation and have
not included papers that discuss the efficiency costs of altrnative tax rules
or that prescribe systems of optimal taxation.
This volume is thus not a book about economic policy as such but an
attempt to understand how an important aspect of government policy influences
the functioning of a modern economy. Moreover, the individual papers do not—3—
represent a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of capital taxation but focus
on those questions that have appeared to me to be both economically important
and analytically tractable. Although the empirical studies deal almost exciusi-.
vely with the United States, I believe that much of the empirical work as well
as the analytic papers will be of more general relevance.
The papers that are collected here were published in a variety of aca-
demic journals during a period of more than a dozen years. Not surprisingly, I
would no longer agree with everything that I wrote in all of them. More iinpor-
tant, if I were doing the studies now I would in several cases use somewhat
different theoretical models or statistical methods. I have nevertheless resisted
the temptation to make substantial changes because, if I once started, there
would be no natural place to stop. I do moreover still believe the basic
conclusions of each of the papers included here.
The present chapter summarizes these specific conclusions and indicates
the structure of the overall analysis that links the individual papers.
Household and Corporate Saving
A nation's rate of capital accumulation is governed by the amount of
saving that is done within its borders. Although international capital flows
can supplement or reduce the funds available for investment, in practice net
international capital flows have been quite small relative to domestic savings
and investment. Moreover, long—run differences among industrial countries in
the fraction of income that is saved are matched by approximately equal dif.-
ferences in the ratio of domestic investment to national income (Feldatein and
Horioka, 1980). The present study therefore focuses on domestic saving by indi-
viduals and businesses.—4—
In the simplest textbook picture of national saving, all saving is
done by individuals who save during their working lives for consumption during
retirement. This life cycle model has shown itself to be a powerful tool for
thinking about saving and capital accumulation and provides the framework for
the analysis in Chapter 1 of this volume. A more realistic picture, however,
recognizes that not all individual saving is for retirement and that a very
large part of saving is done by corporations. The subsequent chapters in this
section therefore look beyond the simple life cycle model and consider expli-
citly the role of corporate saving and its interaction with personal savings.
An economy's tax rules can affect the process of saving in a variety
of ways. Any tax that drives a wedge between the pretax marginal product of
capital and the net—of—tax return that savers receive will distort the saving
decisions. Chapter 2 shows that under existing law that tax wedge is very
large, with federal, state and local taxes taking more than two—thirds of the
real pretax return on nonfinancial corporate capital. The effect of changing
this wedge by increasing the taxation of consumption or labor income and
decreasing the taxation of capital income is the subject of Chapter 1.
The tax laws also affect the extent of corporate saving by altering
the return on corporate capital and by inducing companies to reduce dividends in
favor of retained earnings. Chapters 3 through 5 examine the effect of tax
rules on corporate dividend behavior. The theory suggests and the evidence con-
firms that existing tax rules significantly distort the corporate financial
decisions in favor of a higher level of retained earnings. The effect of this
increase in corporate savings on total private savings depends on the extent to
which shareholders "see through the corporate veil" and reduce their own savings
in response to the higher level of corporate saving. The reaction of share——5—
holdersand therefore of total saving is the subject of Chapters 6 and 7.
The final chapter of this section uses the estimates of the earlier
chapters to examine the effect of alternative corporate tax integration propo-
sals on aggregate capital accumulation. The impact of integration dependson
the effect of the resulting higher net rate of return to savers and on the
effect of the increase in dividends on personal savings. The evidencesuggests
that although corporate tax integrations could do much to reduce the distortions
in corporate finance and resource allocation thatcurrently exist, the net
impact of integration on aggregate savings is likely to be small.
The first chapter, "The Rate of Return, Taxation and Personal
Savings," examines how the tax wedge between the pre—tax and after—tax rates of
return affects the level of saving. The results are surprising and contrary to
conventional wisdom. The analysis shows that replacing a tax on capital income
with a tax on labor income can actually decrease private saving. However,even
when this anomalous result is true, such a tax change will raise national
saving, i.e., the sum of private and public saving.
The analysis uses a simple life cycle model in which an individual
works in the first period of life and saves to finance consumption in the second
period when no work is done. Substituting a payroll tax or consumption tax for
an income tax of equal present value lowers the price of second—periodconsump-
tion relative to present consumption (because capital income is not taxed) and
therefore unambiguously causes an increase in futureconsumption and a decrease
in current consumption.
Therisein future consumption does not, however,imply that first—
period saving must rise. Future consumption can rise even if current saving—6—
fallsbecause the change in tax rules raises the net rate of return that con-
verts present saving into future consumption.
Afall in both current saving and current consumption appears at first
tobe inconsistent with the individual's budget constraint. In fact, a fall in
both only implies that the individual's current taxes have risen, i.e., that
taxes have been moved forwardfrom retirement years to working years. This
obviouslyhappens when a payroll tax is substituted for a tax on capital income
since none of the payroll tax is paid during retirement years. It also happens
when a consumption tax is substituted for a tax on capital income.
The crucial implication of this analysis is that the substitution of a
consumption tax or a payroll tax for the tax on capital income reduces current
consumer expenditure and therefore frees resources for investment even if per-
sonal savings are not increased. Since current consumption falls, the sum of
private saving and tax payments must rise. This in turn implies that if govern-
ment spending does not change, national saving will rise even if private saving
falls. The response of the government surplus or deficit to the tax change is
therefore of substantial importance. Maintaining a balanced budget when substi—
tuting a payroll tax for an equal-present-value capital income tax must imply a
rise in government spending and therefore may imply a fall ih national saving.
The analysis of chapter one also shows the importance of the tran-
sition from one tax regime to the next. In a simple two—period life—cycle model
with overlapping generations, the older generation that already exists when the
tax law changes (and has paid tax under the old regime) must be treated dif—
ferently from all future generations to avoid imposing a windfall tax loss or
gain and a corresponding change in national saving.-7-
Before turning to the empirical studies in subsequent chapters, it is
useful to establish what has been happening to effective tax rates on capital
income. Because of the complexity of the tax rules, the statutory tax rates are
a very poor indication of actual effective tax rates. Moreover, in recent
years, the combination of high rates of inflation and the conventional
accounting procedures have substantially exacerbated this problem.
The second chapter, "The Effective Tax Rate and the Pretax Rate of
Return," (written with Louis Dicks—Mireaux and James Poterba) examines empiri-
cally the effective tax rate paid on the earnings of capital in the nonfinancial
corporate sector of the United States in the quarter century ending in 1979.
The total tax paid by the corporations, their shareholders and their
creditors in 1979 to governments at all levels was 69 percent of the real capi-
tal income of the corporations, including both debt and equity income. This
effective tax rate fluctuated between 53 percent and 85 percent during the
previous quarter century. It is clear that such high tax rates deserve careful
attention in any attempt to understand the process of capital accumulation.
The analysis in Chapter 2 stresses the importance of looking beyond
the tax paid by the corporations themselves to include also the taxes paid by
shareholders and creditors. The evidence also shows that an important share of
the total tax is paid to state and local governments; these taxes exceed 17per-
cent of real pretax capital income.
Failure to look at all the relevant taxes gives a misleading picture
of the trend as well as of the level of capital taxation. Thetaxes paid directly
by the corporations themselves, i.e., corporate tax payments to all levels of
government plus state and local property tax payments, fell from 59 percent of
real capital income in the first five years of the sample period (1953 through-8-
1957) to 47 percent in the five years ending in 1979. Much of this fall
reflects the impact of inflation which raised the nominal interest expenses that
companies could deduct in calculating taxable income. But this reduction in
corporate tax liabilities was offset by increases in the taxes paid. by creditors
and shareholders. The total tax rate paid by corporations, creditors and share-
holders was nearly as high in the five years from 1975 to 1979 (68 percent) as
it had been from 1 953 to 1 957 (70 percent).
The total effective capital income tax rate remained high despite a
series of reductions in the statutory tax rates paid by corporations and indivi-
duals and despite the introduction of the investment tax credit and the use of
accelerated depreciation. The effective and statutory tax rates behaved so dif—
ferently because the interaction of inflation with the historic cost methods of
tax accounting caused an understatement of the costs of production and therefore
an increasing ratio of taxable income to real income. This is particularly
clear in the period since inflation began to accelerate in the mid-1960's.
Between 1963 and 1967, the total effective tax rate was 55 percent; a decade
later, it averaged71 percent and ended the 1970's at 69 percent.
The analysis in chapter 2 also provides estimates of the pretax rate
of return to capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector for each year since
1948. For this calculation, the usual national income account measure of
profits is adjusted by adding back in the property taxes paid by these cor-
porations. Between 1948 and 1979, the total pretax return averaged 11.5 per-
cent. The 1960's were a decade of greater than average profitability; even
after adjusting for cyclical fluctuations in profitability, profitability in the
1960s was about 1.5 percent higher than in the 1970s.-9--
The combination of lower pretax profitability in the 1970s and a
higher effective tax rate caused the net—of—tax rate of return to decline
sharply between the 1960s and the 1970s. The average real net rate of return
was 5.2 percent in the 1960s but only 3.1 percent in the 1970s. The statistical
analysis shows no evidence that the broad fluctuations in the effective tax rate
over the past 25 years induced offsetting changes in the opposite direction by
the pretax rate of return. Changes in the effective tax rate were therefore
associated with correspondingly large changes in the net rate of return.
These figures are indicative of the very substantial magnitude of
capital income taxes as a share of real capital income. They do not, however,
provide an estimate of the marginal tax rates on income from different types of
capital or of the marginal tax rates that apply to individual savers in dif-
ferent situations. For example, to the extent that the depreciation rules for
new investment are more generous than they had been at an earlier time, the
effective marginal tax rate is below the average tax rate. Conversely, if the
typical individual receives some capital income in an untaxed pension but does
all marginal saving in forms that are taxed, the effective marginal tax rate
will be above the average rate. The extent to which low tax options are and are
not marginally available and attractive requires more study.
Corporate saving plays a major role in the process of capital accumu-
lation. In 1979, for example, corporate retained earnings were $59 billion
while personal saving was $86 billion; corporate saving thus accounted for 41
percent of total net private saving. Moreover, this figure substantially under-
states the relative size of corporate saving because it ignores the fall in the
real value of the net debt of nonfinancial corporations caused by inflation.-10-
The 10 percent inflation in 1979 (as measured by the personal consumer
expenditure deflator) reduced the value of corporate debt by $ 73
billion, thereby transferring that amount from personal saving to a corrected
measure of corporate saving and raising corporate saving to 91 percent of total
private saving.
The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends
is the primary puzzle of corporate finance. During the past 15 years, dividends
have averaged 45 percent of real after—tax profits. Before 1982, dividends were
taxed at rates varying up to 70 percent and averaging nearly 40 percent for
individual shareholders. In contrast, retained earnings imply no concurrent tax
liability; the rise in the share value that results from retained earnings is
taxed only when the stock is sold and then at least 60 percent of the gain is
untaxed. Why then do corporations not eliminate or sharply reduce their divi-
dends and increase their retained earnings? And how do alternative tax systems
influence the way in which corporations divide their income between dividends
and retained earnings? These questions are the subject of chapters 3, 4, and 5.
In the third chapter, "Why Do Companies Pay Dividends?", Jerry Green
and I develop a simple theoretical model in which firms choose to pay dividends
in order to maximize the value of their shares. The analysis emphasizes the
heterogeneity of shareholder tax rates and the desire of shareholders to
diversify their investments.
We consider an economy with two kinds of investors: taxable indivi-
duals and untaxed institutions (like pension funds and nonprofit organizations).
Firms can distribute profits currently or retain them and thereby raise the
value of the firm's capital stock. Shareholders can sell their shares and
realize this increased value in the form of capital gains. In the absence of—11—
uncertainty, these assumptions would lead to a segmentation of the market and
specialization of share ownership, with the share price per dollar of retained
earnings less than one. In the equilibrium, the taxable individuals would
invest only in firms that pay no dividends even though, ceteris paribus, they
would prefer an immediate paymentwhileuntaxed investors would buy only the
sharesof firms that paid all profits out immediately as dividends. If untaxed
investors did otherwise, they would reduce the income they earned per dollar
spent on purchasing shares. The taxable individuals, in contrast, willingly
accept the lower pretax income because it corresponds to greater after-tax
income. This type of segmented equilibrium is not observed because of uncer-
tainty. Because investors regard each firm's return as both unique and uncer-
tain, they wish to diversify their investments. Chapter 3 shows that each firm
can, in general, maximize its share price by attracting both types of investors
and that this requires a dividend policy of distributing some unique fraction of
earnings as dividends. Only in the special cases of little or no uncertainty or
of a limited ability to diversify risks (because of a high enough correlation
among the returns of different companies) can the equilibrium be of the
segmented form.
The simple model of section 3 cannot be applied directly to an economy
with a large number of firms. Since the riskiness of a portfolio decreases as
the number of securities increases, a segmented equilibrium could be established
with two groups of securities, one of which pays out all earnings and the other
of which retains all of is earnings. We believe, !Joever,that the s1nple
model could be extended to prevent such segrcintatioii and preaerve the optimal
dividend result byintroducingsome diversity of expectations among the two
groupsofshareholders withrespect to the prospects for each firm.—12—
Within the simple framework, the model of chapter 3 can be used to
examine the comparative statics of how the dividend payment rate would respond to
changes in tax rules. The analysis shows that a rise in the tax rate on divi-
dends unambiguously raises total retained earnings although the dividends of any
particular company may actually be decreased. This model thus provides an
explicit rationale for the earlier empirical research for the United Kingdom
that is reported in Chapters 4 and 5.
Between 1950 and 1958, the British government operated a corporate
income tax system that taxed dividends more heavily than retained earnings. The
relative rates of tax within this framework were changed several times.
Beginning in 1959, the differential taxation was ended and a pound of retained
earnings had an opportunity cost of a pound of dividends. Chapter 4, "Corporate
Taxation and Dividend Behavior," uses quarterly financial data to estimate the
effect of the changing tax rules on the dividend payout rate. Chapter 5 extends
this analysis by considering more general functional specifications.
The evidence in these chapters indicates that increasing the oppor-
tunity cost of retained earnings (measured in terms of the foregone net dividend
income to an individual shareholder who paid the 'standard rate' of British per-
sonal income tax) raised dividends substantially. The elasticity of the
equilibrium dividend—income ratio with respect to tax—induced changes in the
opportunity cost of retained earnings is approximately 0.9 and the first year
impact elasticity is approximately 0.4. The abolition of the differential tax
in 1958 raised the opportunity cost of retained earnings by nearly 50 percent
and therefore raised the equilibrium dividend payout rate by some 40 percent.
Although the parameter estimates are quite robust with respect to a—13-
variety of different specifications and estimation methods, the constant elasti-
cityspecification should be regarded as only an approximation. As the analysis
ofchapter 3 implies,a tax system that penalized retained earnings for
investorsit-i all tax situations would lead to a 100 percent payout and not to
the behavior implied by a constant elasticity relation. It is clear however
that, in the range of tax rates in which a 100 percent payout is preferred by
some investors but not by others, the actual payment rate is quite sensitive to
thestructure of taxation.
Thesensitivity of the dividend payout rate to relative tax rates
implies that the current U.S. system of corporate income taxation substantially
increases the retained earnings of existing corporations. The higher level of
corporate saving does not, of course, imply an equal net increase in the total
private saving of individuals and corporations. To the extent that shareholders
"see through the corporate veil" and take the corporate saving into account in
making their own saving decisions, the higher level of corporate saving need not
change total private saving at all. Similarly, the greater retained earnings of
existing corporations does not necessarily mean that they invest more or that
new businesses have a harder time raising capital. The established corporations
that retain more earnings may as a result borrow less and issue less equity,
thereby leaving more external funds for new businesses and fOr other firms with
a greater net demand for capital. Under an appropriate set of simplifying
assumptions, the greater retained earnings would be exactly offset by reduced
personal saving and a lower level of external finance, leaving all significant
aspects of capital formation unchanged.
The economy may not, however, correspond to those simplifying assump——14—
tions. Individuals may not "see through the corporate veil" or may feel
constrained by capital gains tax rules and estate taxes not to offset increased
retained earnings by selling shares. Corporations may treat retained earnings
differently from external funds. New business may have a harder (oreasier)
time raising money when other and more established firms are not raising equity
capital. Moreover, to the extent that the greater retained earningsraise the
total saving rate, those firms that are seeking external capital may findit
easier to obtain. The impact of increased retained earnings on total capital
accumulation and on its distribution among sectors and firms is thus an empiri-
cal issue.
Chapters 6 and 7 address one aspect of this issue, the effect of
retained earnings on total private saving. Chapter 6 deals with the U.S.
experience from 1929 through 1965 while Chapter 7 deals with theBritish postwar
experience. Both studies examine the effect of corporateretained earnings on
household consumer expenditure. The conventional Keynesian consumption function
that relates consumer expenditure to disposable income implicitly assumes that
reducing dividends by a dollar and increasing retained earnings by an equal
amoint will lower consumer expenditure by nearly one dollar, i.e., by the margi-
nal propensity to consume. In this common specification of behavior, households
do not see through the corporate veil at all and a tax—induced rise in retained
earnings raises private saving nearly dollar for dollar. In contrast,the less
common specifications of consumer expenditure behavior associated with Irving
Fisher that relates consumer spending to labor income and the real rate of
interest implies that shifts of funds between retained earnings and dividends
have no effect on consumer spending.—15—
Theanalysis of chapters 6 and 7considersa more general specifica-
tion of the consumer expenditure function that includes retained earnings as a
separate variable and therefore within which the impact of thedividendpayment
decision can be estimated. The specification extends the permanent income
hypothesis by emphasizing that consumer spending responds to different com-
ponents of observed income according to the relation between current observed
income of that type and expected future income. Thus, an increase in dividends
has a substantial impact on consumer expenditures because shareholders believe
that such changes are relatively permanent, a view that correctly corresponds to
the distributed lag relation between dividends and corporate profits. In
contrast, an increase in retained earnings that is caused by a transitory rise
in profits does not induce a substantial rise in consumer spending. It would be
wrong, however, to conclude (as the Keynesian specification implicitly does)
that every increase in retained earnings would have a small impact on consumer
spending. A rise in retained earnings that represents a tax-induced switch from
dividends should be regarded as "permanentt' and should therefore have a positive
impact on consumer spending that is comparable to the negative impact of the
reduced dividends. The implication is that, since observed changes in retained
earnings reflect both temporary and permanent changes, the estimated effect of
retained earnings on consumer spending will understate the effect of the relati-
vely permanent changes in retained earnings that result from tax-induced changes
in the dividend payout ratio.
The statistical evidence in both chapters shows that an extra dollar
of retained earnings raises consumer spending substantially, although by less
than an extra dollar of disposable income. For the United States in the period-16—
from 1929 through 1965,1 the estimates indicate thatan extra dollar of retained
earnings raises consumer spending by 50 cents while an extra dollar of dispo-
sable income raises consumer spending by 75 cents. This differencecan well be
due to the future tax that must be paid when the retained earningsare even-
tually converted to spendable dividends and to the transitory component of
variations in retained earnings. This evidence thus implies that households see
through the corporate veil and adjust their personal savings to changes in cor-
porate savings. The current system o'f corporate income taxation, although
inducing corporations to retain a higher fraction of earnings thanotherwise,
therefore appears to have little if any effect on the total volume of private
saving.
The estimates based on the British experience in the postwar period
("Taxes, Corporate Dividend Policy and Personal Savings: The British Postwar
Experience," done jointly with George Fane) is also contrary to the extreme
Keynesian specification but does imply that the that the dividend payout rate
may influence consumption. The long—run propensity to consume out of disposable
income is estimated to be 0.77 while the long run propensity to consume retained
earnings is only 0.23. The British evidence thus suggests that a tax policy
that reduces dividends by one pound and increasQs retained earningsby an equal
amount may raise total private saving by as much as 0.5 pounds. It is not clear
whether the difference between the U.S. and British estimates are the result of
real differences in behavior or only reflect problems of measurement and estima-
tion of such things as the foreign ownership of British shares. Subsequent stu-
dies with more recent U.S. data confirm the result for the United States.
Additional studies for the United Kingdom remain to be done.
1"Tax Incentives,Corporate Saving and Capital Accumulation," presented in
Chapter 6—11-
The estimated effectes of corporate tax rules on dividend behavior and
of dividend behavior on aggregate private saving can be used to evaluate the
effect of corporate tax integration proposals on capital formation. In Chapter
8, "Corporate Tax Integration: The Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation
and Tax Distribution of Two Integration Proposals," Daniel Frisch and I conclude
that corporate tax integration could eliminate or reduce some of the distortions
in the allocation of capital without significantly reducing overall private saving.
The two alternative corporate tax integration proposals that we con-
sider are: complete integration by the partnership method and a partial
integration method that keeps the tax burden on corporate income unchanged. The
chapter discusses how integration would reduce distortions in the allocation of
resources between the corporate and noncorporate sector, between present and
future consumption and between different types of corporate finance. The analy-
sis then examines the claim of integration advocates that it would raise the
aggregate rate of capital accumulation.
The evidence of Chapters 4 through 7 is used to assess the decrease
in corporate saving that would be likely to result from integration and the
extent of the offsetting increase in personal saving. Since the complete
integration scheme represents a net reduction in the taxation of capital income,
we also consider the implication of the increased net rate of return on aggre-
gate saving. As the analysis of chapter one emphasized, this effect is ambi-
guous. If other taxes are not increased, there is a positive income effect that
may induce an increase in current private consumption as well as in future con-
sumption. If other taxes are increased, the effect on national saving depends
on the responses of both individual and government spending. In particular, if
the present value of tax revenue is unchanged and government spending does not-18-
rise, the rate of return effect implies an increase in national saving. On
balance, it seems best to give little weight to any possible change in aggregate
saving in assessing the effect of corporate tax integration.
Portfolio Investment Behavior
The tax system affects not only the flow of saving and the size of the
capital stock but also the allocation of capital among alternative activities.
Several previous studies have examined how tax rules influence the demand for
housing and the share of housing in the total capital stock.1 The research pre-
sented in the current section focuses on the non—housing portion of individual
portfolio investment behavior.
The analysis here shows that tax considerations substantially distort
the portfolio investment decisions that individuals make under existing tax
rules. Differences in the tax treatment of different kinds of capital income
influence the composition of portfolios and the realization method of taxing
capital gains reduces investors' willingness to revise portfolios in response to
new information.
These distortions in portfolio behavior imply that capital is misallo—
cated among industries and firms. The result is that the wrong products are
produced and that production occurs with inefficient ratios f capital to labor.
In addition, distorting the demand for portfolio assets also alters the mix of
financial assets that firms supply (e.g., the ratio of debt to equity) and the
allocation of risk—bearing in the economy. A full evaluation of the welfare
costs of taxes on portfolio income should evaluate the welfare losses that
1See, for example, Laidler (1969), Aaron (1971) and Feldstein (1981).-19-
result from the misallocation of risk as well as from the distortion of produc-
tion decisions.
Economists first became interested in the effects of taxes on port-
folio behavior when individual income tax rates began rising in World War II.
The very sharp increase in tax rates caused a widespread concern that the tax
system would reduce the willingness of individual portfolio investors to take
risks and that this in turn would raise the market price of risk and induce
firms to make investments with lower risk and therefore lower expected return.
In an important early article, Evsey Domar and Richard Muagrave (1944) argued
that the opposite was more likely to be true: because a tax implies that the
government shares the risk as well as the return on investments, the tax need
not change the net return per unit of net risk but does reduce both risk and
income. In their particular parameterization, this implied that individuals
would unambiguously increase their demand for the risky asset. Subsequent ana-
lysis by Tobin (1958) showed that the same conclusion could be obtained in a
model with expected utility maximization.
By the mid—1960s (when I wrote the paper that appears as chapter 9,
"The Effects of Taxation on Risk-Taking"), professional economists generally
accepted the proposition that a proportional tax with full loss offset increases
personal risk—taking. My paper showed that previous demonstrations relied on
a variety of restrictive and implausible assumptions and that, when these
assumptions are relaxed, the previous conclusion is no longer true. The key
point of the analysis is that even in a restricted world in which a mean—
variance analysis is appropriate, the proportional tax can be shown to increase
risk taking only when there is a riskiess asset with zero yield. When all assets
are risky, or even when the safe asset has a non—zero yield, the effect of a-20-
proportional tax on the demand for risky assets is ambiguous and can only be
resolved by further restrictions on the utility function. Subsequent papers by
Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969) and others identified the restrictions on
utility functions and asset structures that could produce different results
but confirmed that no general theoretical conclusion about portfolio choice
could be obtained.
The theory of portfolio choice thus identifies the basic ways in which
taxation affects portfolio composition without providingany clear answer about
its net effect. Moreover, the actual tax rules that affect portfolio investment
in the United States are quite different from the simple proportional tax with
full loss offset that has been the subject of the theoretical analyses. The
United States taxes nominal capital gains but only on realization and at a
lower rate than other types of capital income. The law also exempts from taxa-
tion the income of state and local government bonds and the implicit income on
owner—occupied housing. Because of the theoretical and institutional complexi-
ties, evaluating the likely effect of the actual progressive tax requires direct
empirical research.
The study presented in chapter 10, "Personal Taxation and Portfolio
Composition: An Econometric Analysis", uses household survey data (the
Federal Reserve Board's survey of income and assets) to study the effects of
taxes on portfolio composition. The first stage of the analysis relates the
composition of each individual's financial wealth to the individual's tax
bracket, wealth, and other relevant variables. The parameter estimates from
these equations are then used to assess the impact of tax rates on asset demand.
The evidence indicates that tax effects are quite important. The
estimatesimply that, with the special features of the U.S. tax system (like—21 —
themethod of taxing capital gains), higher marginal tax rates increase the
demand for common stock and municipal bonds and decrease the demand for other
types of financial assets. A simple model relating asset demand to the relative
net—of—tax asset yields is capable of explaining why different income classes
hold different fractions of their portfolios in each type of asset. The rela-
tive net yield differences can also account for much of the variation among
asset proportions for each income classes. By construction, the differences in
relative net yields reflect only the tax rules and tax rates. The analysis thus
provides strong evidence of the importance of taxes in determining portfolio
composition and asset demand.
The basic question that originally motivated research on the effect of
taxation on risk—taking was whether the tax law discouraged high income indivi-
duals from making investments with high pretax yields and high risks. To answer
this question directly, I calculated an estimated mean pretax yield for the
portfolio of each individual in the sample and a corresponding variance based on
the historic covariance matrix of the individual asset yields. I then related
these measures to the individuals' tax classes, wealth and demographic charac-
teristics. The results indicate that both pretax yield and risk rise with
taxable income. The basic reason for this is the increasing share of equities
in the portfolios of higher income individuals. This in turn was the result of
very progressive tax rates on ordinary income (reaching a maximum rate of more
than 90 percent in the 1962 survey year) and a maximum capital gains tax rate of
25 percent. Thus, the combination of very progressive tax rates on other income
and low tax rates on capital gains encourage an allocation of portfolio wealth
into investments with higher pretax yield than would otherwise have occurred.—22—
Capital gains are not only taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income
but are subject to tax only when an asset is sold. Moreover, the capital gains
tax is avoided completely when an asset is bequeathed, since the recipient takes
the asset's value at the time of transfer as a new basis for calculating sub-
sequent taxable gains. The likely result of this method of taxing capital gains
is to discourage the sale of assets and the realization of taxable gains. To
the extent that investors are "locked into" previous investments in thisway,
the asset markets are less efficient at allocating risks aridresources. The
demand for share of companies whose prices have risen in the past are artifi-
cially inflated while new companies and those whose share prices recently
declined have a harder time attracting buyers.
This potential lock—in problem assumed growing importance in the 1970s
as changes in tax rules raised the maximum tax rate on capital gains. The so—
called "alternative tax" rule that limited the capital gains rate to 25 percent
was modified to restrict its application to the first $50,000 of capital gains.
Other rules governing the "minimum tax" and the "maximum tax" raised the total
marginal rate on capital gains to more than 40 percent for many individuals
before the 1978 reduction in the tax rates on capital gains.
Chapters 11, 12 and 13 report three studies that were designed toeva—
luate the effect of capital gains taxation on the selling of corporate stock and
the realization of capital gains. All three studies indicate that investors are
quite sensitive to tax consideration in their decisions to sell common stock.
An important feature of the first of these studies, "The Effect of the
Capital Gains Tax on the Selling and Switching of Common Stock", which was done
jointly with Shlomo Yitzhaki, was the use of survey data that permitted—23—
separating "switches" of stock (i.e., stock sales followed by purchases of dif-
ferent stock or other financial assets) from "net sales" in whichproceeds are
not reinvested. The distinction is useful because the lock-in effectapplies
only to switch sellers. Although higher capital gains tax rates should unam-
biguously reduce switch—selling, the effect of high tax rates on net selling is
ambiguous. A higher tax rate may discourage an individual from selling
stock in order to buy a consumer durable or to make some other largepurchase,
but an individual who wishes to sell in order to obtainsome given net amount of
after—tax cash will have to sell more if he is in a higher tax bracket than if
he is in a lower tax bracket. The net balance of these two factors determines
whether net selling is an increasing or decreasing function of thecapital gains
tax rate.
The survey data examined in Chapter 11 implies that 56percent of
those who sold stock during the year also purchased other stock and that 58per-
cent of the pretax value of common stock sale proceeds were reinvested incom-
mon stock by the end of the calendar year. The parameter estimates conform to
the theoretical prediction and indicate that the portfolio reallocation deci-
sions ("switches") are particularly sensitive to tax considerations whilenet
selling does not appear to be influenced by the tax rate on capital gains.
The second study, "The Effects of Taxation on the Selling ofCorporate
Stock and the Realization of Capital Gains", done jointly with Joel Slemrod and
Shiomo Yitzhaki and reported in Chapter 12, extends the firstanalysis by exa-
mining a large sample of individual tax returns thatreport sales of corporate
stock. With the tax return data, we were able to estimate the effect oftaxa-
tion on the realization of gains as well as on the sale of stock. Theevidence-24-
supports the earlier finding that corporate stock sales are quite sensitive to
tax rates and then shows that the effect on the value of the net capital gains
that are realized is even stronger. As an indication of the strength of these
effects, the study reports a simulation of lowering the 1973 maximum tax rate on
capital gains to 25 percent. The simulation indicates that, on the basis of the
cross—section differences in realization at different tax rates, this change
would cause nearly a doubling of stock sales and would increase realized gains
by enough to increase tax revenue despite the lower tax rate.In practice, the
actual effect of a lower capital gains tax rate would depend on the extent to
which individuals had realizable gains. Since only a small fraction of accrued
nominal capital gains are actually realized, a very substantial increase in
stock sales and tax revenue is quite possible.
The analyses of Chapters 11 and 12 use cross—section data to estimate
the likely effect of a change in tax rates. These samples permit studying large
numbers of individual taxpayers and making quite precise estimates of their
capital gains tax rates and their sales of corporate stock. Although cross—
section data can in principle provide valid estimates of how individuals would
respond to a change in rules, it is reassuring to have evidence based on a com-
parison of behavior under different tax regimes.
Chapter 13, "The Lock—In Effect of the Capital Gains Tax: Some Time
Series Evidence", written with Joel Slemrod, presents such a "before and after"
comparison. Before 1969, all taxpayers were subject to a maximum capital gain
rate of 25 percent. During the 1970s the capital gains tax rate remained essen-
tially unchanged for moderate income taxpayers but rose substantially for those
with very high incomes and large potential gains. The evidence on capital gains—25—
by income class presented in Chapter 13 shows that the ratio of net capi-
tal gains to other income was actually higher in 1975-76 than in 1967—68among
taxpayers with incomes under $100,000, but fell substantially among higher
income groups. Although it is not possible to make precise parameter estimates
on the basis of these data, they clearly support the sensitivity of capital
gains to tax rules that is implied by the cross-section data.
Consideration of individual portfolio behavior suggestsa significant
modification of the conventional analysis of thecorporate income tax and of
other partial factor taxes. The conventional analysis follows Harberger (1962)
and assumes that capital is allocated among alternative uses in away that
equalizes the after—tax rate of return on capital in all of its uses. The port-
folio perspective implies that this conventional analysis should be modified to
recognize that the net rates of return on capital in different uses are not
generally equal but reflect the risk—return preferences of investors and their
equilibrium portfolio compositions.
The portfolio approach explains why different types of taxpayers
ranging from high tax rate individuals to untaxed pension funds all hold mixed
portfolios despite the differences among taxpayer groups in the relative net
rates of return on different types of assets. If risk considerationswere irre-
levant to these investors, each type of investor would specialize in thepar-
ticular type of investment which had the highest net yield for his tax
situation.
The lack of specialization is significant because itimplies that dif-
ferent groups of portfolio investors may respond differently to tax—induced
changes in the net rates of return. In contrast, the conventional analysis—26—
assumes that there are no differences in response but that all capital owners
respond with an "infinite" asset adjustment to any divergences of net rates of
return.
Chapter 14, "Personal Taxation, Portfolio Choice and the Effect of the
Corporation Income Tax" (written with Joel Slemrod), shows that the portfolio
approach can radically change the implied effect of the corporate income tax on
the sectoral allocation of capital. Corporate income is subject to tax at a
corporate rate of 46 percent; when some fraction of that income is paid as divi-
dends, it is subject to an additional tax at the shareholder's rate of individual
income tax. Before 1982, investment income on noncorporate activities was taxed
at individual rates of up to 70 percent and this same rate was applied to divi-
dend income; since 1982, the maximum individual rate has been reduced to 50 per.-
cent.
Recognizing the differences in personal income tax rates significantly
changes the appropriate analysis of the effect of the corporate income tax.
Although the corporate income tax represents an additional tax for lower income
individuals and untaxed institutions, the corporate tax system can also shelter
retained earnings from high rate of personal taxation. When personal tax rates
were as high as 70 percent and the corporate rate was 48 percent, the total taxa-
tion of corporate income could easily be below the tax rate applicable to the
income of unincorporated businesses. In this situation, the corporate income
tax induces investors with low individual tax rates to shift investments from
the corporate to noncorporate sector but induces investors with high marginal
tax rates to shift resources into the corporate sector.
The net effect of the corporate tax system therefore depends on the—27—
distribution of wealth among investors in different tax classes and on the rela-
tive sensitivity of their adjustments to changes in yields. If the portfolios
of high income individuals are more responsive to yield differences than
the portfolios of low income individuals, the corporate tax system can actually
result in a net flow of capital from the unincorporated sector to the corporate
sector. Chapter 14 presents a two—sector model calibrated to U.S. data for 1973
and shows that the corporate tax system could increase the size of the cor-
porate capital stock with feasible differences in the portfolio balance elasti-
cities. More generally, with portfolio balance elasticities that are more
realistic, the disaggregated portfolio analysis of the U.S. corporate tax system
implies a very substantial reduction in the extent to which the corporate tax
system shifts the capital stock.
The reduction of the maximum individual income tax rate to 50 percent
as of 1982 makes it virtually impossible for anyone to pay a lower tax on cor-
porate income (subject to a 46 percent rate plus a tax on dividends) than on
unincorporated business income.1 This implies that the corporate tax system un-
equivocally reduces the flow of capital to the corporate sector. The lower rate
of individual income tax does not, however, change the general analytic point
that only a disaggregated portfolio analysis can explain the absence of complete
specialization and indicate the likely quantitative response of asset allocation
to changes in tax rules.
1Very small corporations do pay tax rates below 46 percent but these firms
account for a minute fraction of all corporate capital and income.—29—
of investment to tax—induced changes in the cost of capital, this sensitivity
was not estimated independently but was the result of the Cobb-Douglas specifi-
cation that constrained the elasticity of the desired capital stock withrespect
to the cost of capital to be minus one. The statistical estimation only
indicated the time path of the adjustment of inveutinent to chaneu in the coui—
posite variable that reflected both output and the user cost of capital. Even
after Jorgenson's pioneering work, skeptics could still easily believe that all
of the explanatory power in his statistical model came from changes in sales and
that tax policies have no effect on investment.
Only by relaxing the constraint implied by the Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tion can the effect of the tax rules be estimated explicitly. In chapter 15,
"Tax Policy, Corporate Saving and Investment Behavior in Britain," John Flemming
and I estimated a more general specification in which the effect of tax policy
can be examined directly. The natural generalization of the Cobb-Douglas speci-
fication is a constant elasticity of substitution technology in which the
elasticity of substitution is not constrained to be one; this in turn implies
that the elasticity of the desired capital stock with respect to the cost of
capital may also be greater or less than minus one. We adopt this constant
elasticity of substitution specification and then go even further and allow dif-
ferent responses to the different components of the cost of dapital: the depre-
ciation rules, the corporate tax rate, and the net rate of return. In
principle, such response differences might be the result of differences in the
extent to which firms understand these factors arid take them into account or of
differences between permanent and transitory effects.
During part of the sample period that we examined (1954 through 1967),
the British government had used tax policy to encourage greater corporate-30-
saving. The evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5indicatesthat these poli-
cies were successful in achieving this particular aim. The purpose of
encouraging increased retained earnings was of course to raise the rate of
investment.Chapter 15 also examines the extent to which tax—induced chaiies in
retention affect the rate of investment.
The statistical evidence implies that both the accelerated depre-
ciation provisions and the differential taxation of dividends and retained ear-
nings had substantial and significant effects on investment. The data imply
that the responsesto the other components of theuser cost of capital (the tax
rate and the net cost of funds) are weaker and may not have existed at all. The
evidence that tax inducements to increase retained earnings raised investment is
consistent with the finding for Britain (Chapter 7) that higher retained ear-
nings raised total national savings. In short, both types of policies appeared
to be successful in raising capital formation before the differential taxation
ofdividends and retained earnings was abandoned in 1958and the value of acce-
lerateddepreciation was eroded by inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s.
A defect of the Feldetein—Flemming study, as well as of the work of
Jorgenson and his collaborators, is the assumption thatreplacement investment
isa fixed fraction of the capital stock. In chapter 16, "Toward an Economic
TheoryofReplacement Investment", Michael Rothschild and Ishow thatreplace-
ment investment is likely to be quite sensitive to changes in tax laws in both
the short run and the long run. Since replacement investment is approximately
the same magnitude as net expansion investment, this influence of tax rules is
potentially quite important.
A tax change that alters the optimal ratio of capital services to—31—
labor is also likely to alter the optimal planned durability of capital and
therefore the initial amount of capital stock per unit of capital service.
If a particular depreciation change both raises the optimal capital—labor ratio
and favors more durable investment, it will raise investment outlays for both
reasons. Econometric models that ignore changes in durability will attribute
all of the increased.investment to the higher capital—labor ratio and will
therefore overestimate both the sensitivity of the optimal capital stock to the
user cost of capital and the iongrun effect of the tax change on investment.
In addition, a tax change may induce firms to accelerate or delay the
scrapping and replacement of existing equipment by changing the optimal age of
replacement. Chapter 16 shows that under certain conditions, the introduction
of accelerated depreciation increases the optimal replacement age. In
principle, all replacement investment would then be postponed until the oldest
equipment reached the new optimal age. Investment would eventually rise because
of the increase in the optimal capital—labor ratio but would fall temporarily
because of postponed replacement. An econometric analysis that ignores the
delay in replacement would therefore underestimate the response of the optimal
capital intensity to the tax change.
These examples illustrate that the simplified specification of repla-
cement investment that still characterizes econometric studies of investmentmay
be an important source of bias in estimating the way in which tax rules affect
investment. More generally, the analysis of chapter 16 implies that the impact
of tax rules on replacement investment may be very significant and deserves more
careful econometric analysis than it has received.—32—
As I noted in discussing the effective tax rate calculations of
Chapter 2, the increasing rate of inflation that began in the mid-1960s has had
a major effect on the taxation of capital. This occurs because the taxable
income of businesses and individuals is calculated by conventional accounting
methods that evaluate nominal rather than real capital income. The use of
historic cost depreciation and first—in/first-out inventory accounting cause an
understatement of the costs of production and therefore an overstatement of
taxable income. The use of nominal interest rather than real interest causes an
overstatement of the borrowers' costs and an overstatement of the lenders'
income. And the taxation of nominal capital gains causes a rise with inflation
in the effective tax rate on individual equity investors. The net result of all
three forms of capital income misrneasurement is to raise the effective tax rate
on the income from business investment as inflation rises.
This interaction between inflation and tax rules implies a substantial
non—neutrality of inflation and shows the importance of an economy's fiscal
structure as a determinant of its macroeconomic equilibrium. Chapter 17,
"Inflation, Tax Rules and Investment: Some Econometric Evidence," focuses on
the primary effect of the tax—inflation interaction; its impact on non-
residential fixed business investment.
There are a number of complex channels by which the inflation-tax
interaction affects business investment. The higher effective tax rate on capi-
tal income changes the incentive to save and directs more of aggregate saving
into owner—occupied housing. The incentive for business investment is depressed
by the lower real net-of—tax return that can be earned on any given investment
but is encouraged to the extent that firms use debt finance and face a lower
real net—of—tax cost of debt.—33—
Chapter17 begins by acknowledging that the effect of the tax-
inflation interaction on investment is too complex to be described accurately by
any single econometric model. Although models like that of Chapter 15 can be useful,
they represent a substantial simplification in their specification of tech-
nology, of the market environment of firms, of financial behavior, etc. Because
any econometric specification is therefore a "false model", it is useful to
estimate alternative specifications in which the potential biases are likely to
be different. Because all inference is necessarily based on false models, the
robustness of results is the best indication of economic reality.
Three quite different models are presented in Chapter 17. The most
explicit specification is an extension of the generalized C.E.S. capital stock
adjustment specification of Chapter 15 in which substantial care is given to the
measurement of the effects of inflation. An alternative model of investment
behavior that avoids some of the restrictions of the capital stock adjustment
process relates investment to the difference between the net return on invest-
ment and the net cost of funds. Finally, there is a model that is more of a
reduced form, relating nonresidential investment to the real net return that is
earned by those who provide the capital.
All three models indicate that net nonresidential fixed investment is
quite sensitive to tax rules and that the interaction of inflation and the U.S.
tax rules that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s can account for much of the
nearly 40 percent decline in the net investment share in GNP that occurred
between the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s. Although the chapter does
not deal explicitly with the 1981 tax legislation that significantly shortened-34-
the depreciation lives of plant and equipment, the analysis implies that this
change should raise investment substantially and should reduce the sensitivity
of effective tax rates and of investment to changes in inflation.
Tax Incidence in a Growing Economy
Thefive final chapters in this volume look at capital taxation in a
general equilibrium framework. The analyses are theoretIcal and examine econ
miesin steady state equilibrium growth. A principal focus of each chapter is
the impact of some tax on the returns to capital and labor but the analyses go
beyond the issue of tax incidence to examine the more general effects of the tax
on the behavior of economic agents.
The first of these studies, "Tax Incidence in a Growing Economy with
Variable Factor Supply" (Chapter 18), shows that the long-run incidence of a tax
depends only on its effect on the share of national income that is saved. The
effect of the tax on the supply of labor is irrelevant in the long—run because
changes in the supply of labor induce corresponding changes in the supply of
capital that make the capital—labor ratio (and therefore the factor returns)
independent of the labor supply. The irrelevance of the labor supply response
very clearly distinguishes the implications of long—run growth incidence from
the implications of static analyses of tax incidence.
The specific analysis of Chapter 18 deals with the effect of a general
"payroll tax" on labor income. If the tax does not alter the fraction of
national income that is saved, the entire burden of the tax is borne by labor
and the return to capital remains unchanged. If, however, some fraction of the
taxed income would have been saved while the government saves none of the tax—35--
revenue, the effect of the tax is to lower the national saving rate and there-
fore to reduce the economy's equilibrium capital—labor ratio. This in turn
raises the rate of return to capital and lowers the pretax return to labor.
In this case, labor bears more than 100 percent of the payroll tax. More
generally,the effect of the tax depends on the redistribution of incomeamong
groups with different saving rates and the sensitivity of saving to the rate of
return.
Chapter 19, "Incidence of a Capital Income Tax in a Growing Economy
with Variable Savings Rates," extends the analysis of tax incidence in a growing
economy to the case of a tax on capital income. The results of this analysis
are again very different from the implications of a static general equilibrium
model. In a static general equilibrium model with a 'fixed capital stock, owners
of capital would bear the entire burden of a. general tax on capital income.
When the capital stock is instead made endogenous, a substantial fraction of the
burden of a general tax on capital income may be borne by labor. The precise
incidence depends on the elasticity of the saving rates of different types of
taxpayers with respect to the net rate of return.
The contrast between the irrelevance of the labor, supply elasticity
and the sensitivity of the results to the savings elasticities is striking.
This difference reflects the fact that capital is a derived factor of production
and is thus a function of the labor supply and labor income while the opposity
is not true. It implies that the providers of capital may ultimately avoid some
of the burden of any tax in a way that is not available to the providers of
labor services.
Although the analysis of chapter 19 refers to a general tax on capital—36—
income rather than a partial tax like the corporate income tax, it suggests that
the implications of the traditional static analysis of the corporate income tax
would not remain valid if the very long—run incidence were examined explicitly.
In an economy with more than one type of capital asset, changes in the
taxation of a particular type of capital income cause an immediate change in the
price of the corresponding asset and may cause changes in other asset prices as
well. These asset price changes capitalize the changes in future net incomes.
Such capitalization effects are an important aspect of the distributional effect
of a tax change and can also play a key role in the reallocation of assets.
Chapter 20 extends the traditional theory of capitalization and of tax
incidence by using a model of a growing economy with overlapping generations.
The analysis is applied to a tax on pure land rent, the classic case of a tax
that has been assumed to be unshiftable and therefore to be fully capitalized in
the price of land. This study, "The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent:
A New Answer to an Old Question," shows that even a tax on pure rent can be
shifted to other forms of capital.
This surprising conclusion comes from recognizing that land is a store
of value as well as a factor of production. When a tax on rent destroys some of
the market value of land, savers must hold more reproducible capital as part of
their life cycle saving. The tax on rent thus increases the stock of reprodu-
cible capital, thereby raising the capital—land ratio and the capital-labor
ratio. The result of this is a higher pretax rent and higher wages. Chapter 20
presents an explicit model of this process and shows how the value of land might
even be raised by a tax on rental income.
Although this analysis is limited to the case of pure land rents, it
has obvious implications for the corporate income tax, for taxes on natural-37-
resourcesand for all other partial taxes on particular types of capital incorrie.
It shows the importance of describing explictly thewayin which any tax change
alters existing capital values and the accumulation of capital.
In Chapter 21, "Corporate Financial Policy and Taxation in a Growing
Economy." Jerry Green, Eytan Sheshinski and I use the framework Of an economy
in equilibrium growth to examine how a system of profits taxation affects cor-
porate financial decisions and the net returns to individual investors in debt
and equity. The framework of equilibrium growth is important in this context
because it constrains the debt—equity ratio and the dividend-payment rate to
combinations that are consistent with the exogenously given growth of each
firm's capital stock. The corporate—type tax system that we study favors both
borrowing and retained earnings but a firm cannot maintain both a high debt—
equity ratio and a low dividend payment rate without generating an excessive
growth rate for its capital stock.
The effect of the corporate—type tax system on the debt—equity ratio
depends on the portfolio balance behavior of individual investors. If an
increase in the net yield on debt relative to equity causes a rise in the
desired debt—equity ratio, the corporate tax system raises the equilibrium debt—
equity ratio.
Changes in the ratio of debt to equity complicate the analysis of the
effect of tax rules on asset yields because part of any change in asset yields
is their compensation for the change in risk. To clarify the analysis, we
assume that the individual portfolio equilibrium requires a constant debt—equity
ratio. In this context, we obtain the rather surprising result that an increase
in the corporate tax rate reduces the net yield to debt even though interest-38-
payments are deductible by the corporation. Similarly, a higher tax rate lowers
the net yield on equity and reduces the dividendpayment rate.
The analysis showsthat the current structure of corporate andper
sonaltaxes is significantly non—neutral and can significantly distort the
financialbehavior of firms and the returns to the provider of capital.
Extending our analysis to a two—sector model with an endogenous stock of capital
wouldindicate further aspects of non—neutrality.
Thefinal chapter, "Inflation, Income Taxes, andthe Rate of Interest:
ATheoretical Analysis," returns to the interaction of inflation and tax rules
that provided the basis for the econometric study in Chapter 17.In an economy
without income taxes and in which money demand is not a function of the interest
rate, a change in the equilibrium rate of inflation has no effect on the real
economy. This is the "superneutrality" implied by Irving Fisher's original ana-
lysis of inflation. More recently, James Tobin (1965) hasemphasized that the
observed inverse relation between inflation and money demand implies that an
increase in the rate of inflation causes a portfolio substitution that raises
the equilibrium capital intensity of the economy.
Inreality,this portfolio substitution effect must be very small.
Even a relatively broad definition of the relevant monetary balances implies
that the maximum effect is less than two percent of total wealth. An economy's
tax rules are therefore likely to have a much more substantial effect by
influencing the total supply of saving and its allocation among alternative
uses.
The analysis of Chapter 22 considers a particularly simple tax struc-
ture that illustrates how fully anticipated inflation can change the real return—39—
tosavers and therefore the rate of saving. The model focuses exclusively on
the difference between the tax rate of corporate borrowers and the tax rate of
the individual savers who lend to the corporation. The effects of inflation on
depreciation, on inventory profits and on capital gains are all ignored and all
investment is assumed to be financed by debt. In this context, an increase in
the rate of inflation raises the net return to savers if the corporate tax rate
at which interest payments are deducted exceeds the personal tax rate that is
paid on interest receipts. Moreover, since savers in high tax brackets will
generally see their rate of return depressed by inflation (because their per-
sonal tax rates exceed the corporate rate) while savers in low brackets receive
higher rates of return, the net effect on aggregate saving will depend on the
relative sensitivity of saving in the different groups.
Although the analysis of Chapter 22 shows the importance of the
interaction between taxes and inflation, the model is too simple to give even a
qualitative picture of the likely effect of changes in inflation. In a series
of subsequent papers, I have examined the effects of depreciation and capital
gains taxation, the roles of government debt and of owner occupied housing, and
other aspects of the way in which an economys fiscal structure affects. its
macroeconomic equilibrium. These papers and related empiricl research appear
in a separate volume, Inflation, Tax Rules and Capital Formation (University of
Chicago Press, 1983).
The studies included in the current volume have dealt with only some
aspects of the broad subject of capital taxation. These analyses are suf-
ficient, however, to show that the tax system does have substantial and varied-40-
effects on the process of capital accumulation. They are an indication also of
the need for continuing research, both theoretical and empirical, on the ever-
changing system of actual tax rules and on the possibilities for better alter-
natives.—41—
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